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INTRODUCTION

States have always used copyrightable material: school children have
been taught with textbooks, national guard bands have played musical
compositions, and attorneys general have read law treatises. As the role of
state governments has increased, so has state use of copyrighted materials.'
As one might expect, the growing use of copyrighted works by states has
resulted in a corresponding increase in unauthorized state use of copyrighted material. Until 1985, most states and authors 2 assumed that this
unauthorized use ran afoul of federal copyright law, as did most of the
t ©Copyright 1989 Beryl R. Jones Woodin. All rights reserved.
I would like to thank those who assisted in preparing this article, including my research

assistants, the secretaries at Brooklyn Law School, and my colleagues. I would also like to thank
Brooklyn Law School for the research fellowship which supported this article.
*Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. M. Danielson, A. Hershey &J. Bayne, One Nation, So Many Governments 1-17 (1977)

(discussing the expansion of state governments); D. Lufkin, Many Sovereign States 17-34

(1975) (same).
2. This article uses the term "author" as it is used in federal copyright law-to refer to the
originator of a copyrightable work whether the work is a painting, computer program, musical
composition, or book. It will also refer, unless otherwise indicated, to the copyright owner, who
in some circumstances may be different from the author. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1988)
(permitting the transfer of copyrights). By combining authors and copyright owners in the
single reference, I do not mean to suggest that the interests of copyright owners and authors
are at all times identical. Indeed, in some circumstances they may be quite different.
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federal courts that had considered the issue.3 The issue of state liability for
copyright violations, however, took on a substantially different light in 1985
after the Supreme Court issued one of its decisions interpreting the
eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution. 4 That decision,
Atascadero State Hospitalv. Scanlon, held that Congress had to indicate with
"unmistakably clear language" its intent to hold a state liable under federal
law before a private citizen could bring a suit for a violation of that law.5
Following the lead of Atascadero, a number of courts held that authors could
not sue states for copyright violations either because the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution prevented Congress from creating
such a remedy6 or because the Copyright Revision
Act of 19767 did not
8
provide a remedy against state governments.
Although these decisions did not wholly exempt states from compliance with federal copyright law,9 they generated considerable concern in
the copyright community. Many viewed the decisions as inconsistent with
Congressional intent and felt the result conflicted with the basic premises of
copyright law. In response, Congress passed the Copyright Remedy Clarification amendment (Clarification amendment) in 1990.10 The 1990
Act amended the 1976 Act to provide that states can be held liable for
copyright violations, as could any nongovernmental entity."
This Article will discuss the issue of state liability for copyright
violations and the Clarification amendment, arguing that the amendment is
not prohibited by the eleventh amendment of the Constitution and that
federal copyright law can and should protect authors from the unauthorized use of their works by states. First, this Article will review the
background of federal copyright law, the nature of state use of copyrighted
works, and the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution.12
Specific attention will be given to the question of whether the eleventh
amendment, which prevents federal courts from considering certain combination citizen and state suits, also prevents Congress from enacting a
3. See, ?.g., Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979); Johnson v.
University of'Virginia, 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985). But see Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777
(8th Cir. 1962).
4. U.S. Const. amend. XI. See infra text accompanying note 79 for the text of the
amendment.
5. 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
6. U.S. Const. amend. XI. See Mihalek v. Michigan, 595 F. Supp. 903,905-06 (E.D. Mich.
1984), aff'd on other grounds, 814 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1987).
7. The Copyright Revision Act of 1976, as amended, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1987)) [hereinafter the 1976 Act].
8. E.g., BV Eng'g v. University of Calif., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394, 1395, 1400 (9th Cir.
1988) (Congress did not create a copyright cause of action against states), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1090 (1989); Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford Univ., 852 F.2d 114, 117 (4th
Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, (1989); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 871
F.2d 166, 169 (1st Cir. 1989) (same). See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
10. Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501, 511).
11. See S. Rep. No. 305, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990); H. Rep. No. 282, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1989).
12. See infra notes 19-178 and accompanying text.
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combination citizen and state copyright remedy for monetary damages
which may be enforced in federal courts. The Supreme Court's 1989
decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas13 significantly alters the controversy
which has developed over the years with respect to the scope of congressional power to enact such legislation. Prior to that decision, commentators
generally had viewed the issue to be simply whether Congress could
provide combination citizen and state remedies pursuant to any of its
Article I powers.' 4 These commentators had assumed that when the Court
finally decided the issue with respect to one of the Article I powers, it would
decide the issue with respect to all of them, including the copyright clause.15
Accordingly, the scope of Congress' power with respect to the copyright
clause was not specifically addressed. In Union Gas, however, the Supreme
Court limited the scope of its decision to only one of Congress' Article I
powers, holding that the commerce clause provides Congress with authority to create combination citizen and state remedies.' 6 The question of
Congress' power to create such remedies pursuant to any of its other Article
I powers, including the copyright clause, was not clearly addressed by the
Court. The first section of this Article demonstrates, through an application
of the Court's reasoning in Union Gas, that there is no constitutional bar to
permitting authors to
the Clarification amendment which creates a remedy
17
sue states for unauthorized use of their works.
Second, this Article will examine some of the doctrinal problems that
are raised by unauthorized state use of copyrighted material.' 8 This Article
concludes that the Clarification amendment is a necessary addition to the
1976 Act.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. CopyrightBackground
The United States Constitution's copyright clause empowers Congress
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries. '"19 By its terms, the copyright clause
13. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion).

14. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (containing several clauses pursuant to which Congress can

"make laws") [hereinafter Article I powers].

15. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to enact copyright legislation)
[hereinafter the copyright clause]. The copyright clause reads: 'To promote the Progress of

Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
16. 491 U.S. at 22.
17. See infra notes 125-78 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 181-205 and accompanying text.

19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The same constitutional clause provides authority to enact

patent legislation. The issue of state liability for copyright violations is closely related to the

issue of their liability for patent violations. For a discussion of that issue, see Chew v. State of

Calif., 893 F.2d 381 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 44 (1990); Lemelson v. Ampex Corp.,
372 F. Supp. 708, 710-13 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (eleventh amendment does not prevent suits against
states for patent violations); Chisum, The Allocation ofJurisdiction Between State and Federal
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grants Congress the power to protect the "Writings" of "Authors" in order
to promote the arts and sciences. Courts have construed these words to
enable Congress to provide protection for a broad range of works. The
term "author" has been construed to refer not only to the creator of a
literary work but also to the "[person] to whom anything owes its origin;
originator; maker .... ,"20 In a similarly broad manner, the term "writings"
has been "interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of
creative[,] intellectual[,] or aesthetic labor,"21 including paintings, musical
compositions, charts, and books. 22
In 1790, the first Congress of the United States adopted the first
statute passed pursuant to the copyright clause.23 Since that time, there
have always been federal copyright statutes.2 4 The statute currently in force
is the 1976 Act.25 The 1976 Act vests copyrights, for a limited time,26 in
authors27 of a series of enumerated works.2 8 With copyrights, authors
obtain a series of exclusive rights, such as the rights of reproduction and
performance.2 9 Anyone who exercises these rights without authorization by
the author violates federal copyright law.30 The 1976 Act imposes liability
for the unauthorized use of a copyright work under section 501 which
provides: "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights . . . is an
infringer.... The... owner of an exclusive right.., is entitled.., to
institute an action for any infringement of that particular right ....
Prior to 1985 and the Atascadero decision, most, although not all, of
Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 633 (1971) (arguing against state court
jurisdiction over patent infringement cases); Note, Constitutional Law: Sovereign ImmunityRight of Patentee to Bring Suit in Federal Court Against a State Agency for Patent
Infringement, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 1595 (1973) (arguing that state may not be held liable for
patent violations).
20. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). This Article uses the
term "authors" in a similar manner.
21. Goldtein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). This Article uses the term "writings"
in a similar manner.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102(5) (1988) (pictures are copyrightable); 17 U.S.C. § 102(2) (1988)
(musical compositions are copyrightable); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(5) (1988) (charts are
copyrightable); 17 U.S.C. § 102(1) (1988) (books are copyrightable).
23. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch.15, 1 Stat. 124.
24. Congress amended the 1790 statute 25 times between 1789 and 1904. Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 209 n.12 (1954). Congress revised the statute extensively in 1909. See Act of Mar.
4, 1909, ch. 20, 35 stat. 1075 [hereinafter the 1909 Act]. Congress adopted a major revision
of the 1909 Act in 1976. The coverage provided by the 1976 Act has also been extended by
amendments. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(b), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 117 (1988)) (extending coverage to computer programs); Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98
Stat. 3347-3355 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (1984)) (providing for coverage of semiconductor chip products).
25. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914
(1987)).
26. 17 US.C. §§ 301-305 (1976) (setting forth the duration of copyrights).
27. Id. § 201 (1976) (vesting copyrights in authors).
28. Id. § 102 (1976) (enumerating protected works).
29. Id. § 106 (1976) (enumerating exclusive rights in copyrights).
30. Id. § 501 (1976) (providing a remedy for infringements).
31, Id.
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those courts that had considered the question of liability of states had held
that states were covered by the federal copyright law.3 2 After Atascadero, the
courts uniformly held that no remedy was available. Some of these
post-Atascadero decisions held that states were not among the class of
potential defendants defined by the 1976 Act.3 3 Others concluded that
regardless of whether the statute was intended to include such a remedy,
the eleventh amendment prevented Congress from providing it.34 The
clear consensus was, however, that states could not be sued for monetary
damages under the 1976 Act. These post-Atascadero decisions were wrong;
the 1976 Act did provide a remedy. All the evidence shows that Congress
intended to impose liability on the statbs under the 1976 Act.3 5 Not only
does the 1976 Act contain exemptions for state liability that would have
been meaningless if there had been no interest on Congress' part to impose
initial liability on states,3 6 but also the legislative history of the 1976 Act is
replete with references which assume states can be held liable under the

32. The two best known pre-Atascaderocases, Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962),
and Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979), reached opposite results under
the 1909 Act. In Wihtol, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the suit against a public high school, with
only a very short discussion of the problem. The plaintiff, Austris A. Wihtol, was the author
of a hymn. One of the defendants, Nelson E. Crow, was the head of the Vocal Department of
the Junior College and High School of the Clarinda, Iowa School District. Crow had made an
arrangement of the hymn and distributed copies of it to members of the high school choir and
to members of a church choir he directed. Wihtol brought suit in federal court against Crow,
the school district, and the church, charging them with using his hymn in violation of federal
copyright law. The court held that a "suit against the State of Iowa for the infringement of a
copyright, clearly could not be maintained, because of the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States .... " Wihtol, 309 F.2d at 781.
In Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, the Ninth Circuit permitted the plaintiff to proceed with his
claim. The plaintiffs in Mills charged the state of Arizona and the Arizona Coliseum and
Exposition Center Board with using without permission the composition "Happiness Is" as the
theme for promotion of an Arizona state fair. Relying on a trilogy of eleventh amendment
cases, Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964), Employees
v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973), and Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1974), the Ninth Circuit held that a state's eleventh
amendment immunity was waived when Congress chose to regulate in an area and a state
entered that regulated area. 591 F.2d at 1283. The Mills court reasoned that Congress
intended for states to be included among the class of defendants who could be sued under the
1909 Act, that Arizona's immunity lawfully had been abrogated by the passage of the federal
copyright statute and that Arizona, having voluntarily entered into a federally regulated area,
could be held liable under federal law. Id. at 1284-85.
33, See BV Eng'g v. University of Calif., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394, 1395 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989); Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford Univ., 852
F.2d 114, 116-22 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank
of Boston, 687 F. Supp. 11, 14 (D. Mass. 1988); Cardinal Indus. Inc. v. Anderson Parrish
Assoc., No. 83-1038-Civ.-T-13, slip op. (N.D. Fla. March 12, 1985), aff'd mem., 811 F.2d 609,
cert. denied sub nom., Cardinal Indus. Inc. v. King, 484 U.S. 824 (11th Cir. 1988).
34. Lane, 871 F.2d at 172; BVEng'g, 858 F.2d at 1397; RichardAnderson Photography, 852
F.2d at 122; Mihalek v. Michigan, 595 F. Supp. 903, 903 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
35. See H. Rep. 282, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6; S. Rep. 305, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 5.
36. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1) (1976) (exempting goods imported under the authority
of any state or political subdivision of a state); § 106(a) (1976) (exempting governmental
bodies for liability for certain performances of musical compositions).
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Act.3 7 Furthermore, as the discussion below indicates, the eleventh amendment does not bar combination citizen and state copyright suits. Many in
the copyright community had argued that the decisions denying liability
had left them remediless against states who have violated the federal
copyright laws. This was simply not the case. Using a variety of theories that
had been employed extensively in other areas of the law and to a lesser
extent in copyright cases, authors could have compelled future recognition
of their copyrights, recovered monies for past violations, or both. The
options available to authors were the following: First, suits for injunctive
relief brought against state officers in their official capacity,3 8 second, suits
against state officers in their personal capacity, 39 third, suits brought
37. See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 882-83 (1975); Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 648-49 (1975).
38. One of the earlier cases in which the Court sustained the federal court's authority to
issue injunctions against state officials is Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 1123 (1908). Although
recently the Court seems to have abandoned the Young rationale, it has not abandoned the
result. In Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104-06 (1984), the Court
invoked concerns of federalism to explain the Young rule, namely that the rule provides the
federal government with power to ensure state compliance with federal law. This need for
supremacy of federal authority was, in the Court's view, sufficient to justify construing the
eleventh amendment as not preventing certain injunctive suits against state officers.
On the ba,.is of Young, federal courts have issued innumerable injunctions directing state
officials to comply with a variety of federal laws. E.g., Pennoyer v. McConnaughty, 140 U.S.
1, 24 (1891); Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 696-97 (1982).
The Young doctrine is, however, a tool of only limited use because it applies only to certain
types of equitable relief and does not permit a federal court to use its full panoply of remedies.
In general, cnly prospective injunctive relief is permissible, and equitable relief that would
have the effect of imposing monetary damages is barred. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337
(1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977).
39. Suits against state officers in their personal capacities seek recovery from the
individual officers for actions taken under color of state law. In suits against state officers in
their official capacities, the real party in interest is the state entity, and an award of damages
would be paid from the state's treasury. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). In
contrast, any damages awarded in a personal capacity suit are paid from the personal resources
of the state officer and, thus, are not barred by the eleventh amendment. See Haffer v. Melo,
912 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3581 (Feb. 25, 1991) (eleventh
amendment does not bar claim for damages against state official in suit against her in her
personal capacity).
The issue of personal liability of state officers for copyright daims has received only limited
attention in the reported decisions. Only three decisions even mention the issue. In each case
the court refused to dismiss the action on the ground that personal liability suits were not
permitted and each case found it necessary to consider the merits of the author's claims.
Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 1962); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 687 F.
Supp. 11, 1C-17 (D. Mass. 1988); Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford Univ., 633 F.
Supp. 1154, 1161 (1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 852 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied
489 U.S. 102.3 (1989).
In a very limited number of circumstances, authors may be able to bring suit under the 1976
Act because a state has waived its eleventh amendment immunity. The waiver may be made
either by state legislation or in the state constitution, or by way of a state's decision to bring an
affirmative action in federal court.
The circumstances in which it can be argued that a state constitution or statute waives
eleventh amendment protection, however, are quite limited. See Atascadero State Hosp. v.
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against state agencies that were not protected by the eleventh
amendment,40 and fourth, suits where states had waived their eleventh
amendment immunity. While these alternatives provided some benefit to
copyright holders, they were not adequate to resolve the problems with
state copyright use. The post-Atascadero decisions were received with great
concern by the copyright community, which vigorously lobbied for congressional action. After receiving a report from the Copyright Office
urging modification of the 1976 Act, Congress amended the 1976 Act to
indicate clearly that states are included in the class of potential defendants
described by the term "anyone" in section 501.41
B. The Nature of State Use of Copyrightable Works
Although precise figures on the extent to which states use copyrighted
material are unavailable, there is little doubt that states make extensive use

Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985); Florida Dep't. of Health and Rehabilitative Serv. v.
Florida Nursing Home Ass'n., 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam); Great N. Life Ins. Co.
v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944). But see Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct.
1868 (1990) (state agency has waived eleventh amendment immunity). In two reported
decisions, copyright holders have made this waiver argument, with limited success. Regents of
Univ. of Minn. v. Applied Innovations, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 698, 700 (D. Minn. 1987); Woelffer
v. Happy States of Am. Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499, 503 (N.D. 111.1985).
40. Local governments and independent state agencies are state governmental entities
because they exist pursuant to state authorization. They do not, however, enjoy the immunity
of the eleventh amendment. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 280 (1977).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1976), as amended in 1990, provides in pertinent part:
(a) . . . As used in this subsection, the term "anyone" includes any State, any
instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a state or instrumentality
of a state acting in his or her official capacity. Any state, and any such instrumentality,
officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this tide in the same manner
and to the same extent as any non-governmental entity.
17 U.S.C. § 511 (1990), which was added to the 1976 Act by the Clarification amendments,
§ 2(a), provides in full:
(a) In General. -Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee
of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not
be immune, under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States
or under any doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any
person, including any governmental or non- governmental entity, for a violation of
any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner provided by sections 106 through
119, for importing copies of phonorecords in violation of section 602, or any other
violation under this tide.
(b) Remedies. -In a suit described in subsection (a) for a violation described in that
subsection, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for
the violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for the violation to the
same extent any public or private entity other than a State, instrumentality of a State,
or officer or employee of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Such remedies
include impounding and disposition of infringing articles under section 503, actual
damages and profits and statutory damages under section 504, costs and attorney's
fees under Section 505, and the remedies provided in section 510.
States similarly were made liable for infringing the exclusive rights of the owners of
semi-conductor chip products. See Clarification amendments section 2, codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 910, 911 (1991).

76

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[1991]

of these materials. 42 The range of materials used by states is as broad as the
1976 Act's coverage. For example, state universities and public school
systems use textbooks, 43 give standardized tests,44- show movies to
students, 4'b and use copyrighted music for classes, high school bands, glee
clubs, college radio stations, and college dances. 46 State prisons maintain
libraries, 47 show movies, and play music for prisoners. 48 State agencies
maintain libraries, use computer programs, 49 and train employees with
audiovisual aids.3 0 States show movies at state hospitals,5 1 sponsor fairs at
which copyrighted music is performed, 52 and own public radio and
television stations
over which copyrighted music and literary works are
53
performed.
Although many of these copyrighted works are not created with the
needs of state users in mind, 54 much of the material is created specifically
for use by states. For example, many textbooks and standardized tests used
by public schools and universities have been developed for use by particular
states. 55
While the precise extent of state use of copyrighted material is unclear,
it is undoubtedly considerable. For example, annual textbook sales to state
42. See generally Comment Letters of the Copyright Office, Library of Congress, RM 87-5,
52 Fed. Reg. 42,045 (1987) (materials sent in response to a solicitation of the Copyright Office
on the eleventh amendment and copyright) [hereinafter Comment Letters]; Copyright
Liability of States and the Eleventh Amendment 7-12 (1988) (Library of Congress, Office of
Copyrights) (same) [hereinafter Register of Copyrights Report].
43. See Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 12 at 3; Letter No. 17 at 1; Register
of Copyrights Report, supra note 42, at 10.
44. See Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 17 at 4.
45. Id.; sie id., Letter No. 16 at 4.
46. Id.; sme id., Letter No. 21, Exhibit A at 4; Letter No. 23 at 6; Register of Copyrights
Report, supra note 42, at 8.
47. See generally Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 4- 5 (1989) (describing a prison library).
48. See Brief for Amid Curiae, Columbia Pictures et al., at 3, BV Engineering v. Univ. of
Cal., L.A., 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5920) [hereinafter Brief for Columbia];
Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 23 at 6; Letter No. 16 at 6; Register of Copyrights
Report, supra note 42, at 7.
49. See Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 24 at 1; Letter No. 28 at 1.
50. See Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 17 at Enclosures; Register of
Copyrights Report, supra note 42, at 7.
51. See Brief for Columbia, supra note 48, at 3.
52. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the Sen. Comm. on theJudiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1219, 1338 (1967);
Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 780 (1967).
53. See Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 21, Exhibit C at 4; Letter No. 23 at 6.
54. For example, movies, law books, word processing programs, and popular songs were
created without envisioning state use.
55. See Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 17 at 4. Other works are also designed
specifically for states. For example, computer programs may be developed for use by specific
state agencies, see Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 6, and photographs may be
taken for use by a state university. See Richard Anderson Photography, Inc. v. Brown, 852 F.2d
114 (4th Cir. 1988) (photographs used in student prospectus by state university subject of
copyright suit), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
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colleges and universities have been estimated at $1.1 billion, 56 and textbooks sales to public schools and school districts have been estimated at
another $1.35 billion. 57 State-supported institutions provided for over
eighty percent of the test publishing industry's revenues. 58 Use of copyrighted materials by state-owned public radio and television stations appears to be substantial as well.59 In addition,, the film industry obtains
which are made
substantial revenues from the "second distributions,"
60
principally to state entities, of major motion pictures.
The extent to which states currently use copyrighted materials without
authorization is extremely difficult to ascertain. There are no figures
62
available 6' and there are less than two dozen reported cases on point.
56. See Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 12 at 3; Register of Copyrights
Report, supra note 42, at 12; The Copyright Remedy Clarification Act: Hearings on H.R.
1131 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admin. of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (July 11, 1989) (statement of Ralph
Oman, Register of Copyright).
57. See Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 17 at Enclosures. See also Comment
Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 11 at 2; Letter No. 17 at 1.
58. See Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 17 at Enclosures.
59. In 1986 the Federal Communications Commission gave licenses to state entities for
181 noncommercial educational television stations which used copyrightable materials. See
1985-86 Public Broadcasting Directory for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, cited in
Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 23 at 6 (noting the existence of these stations and
that many, if not all, of these stations have performing rights licenses). The American Society
of Composers and Performers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), the major
performing rights societies, give copyright licenses to numerous state entities. The purpose of
ASCAP and BMI is to enforce the musical composition copyright for the copyright owner. As
the court in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Society of Composers noted:
Prior to ASCAP's formation... there was no effective method by which ... [musical
composition copyright owners] could secure payment for the performance for profit
of their copyrighted works. The users of music, such as theaters, dance halls and bars,
were so numerous and widespread, and each performance so fleeting an occurrence,
that no individual copyright owner could negotiate licenses with users of his music, or
detect unauthorized uses. On the other side of the coin, those who wished to perform
compositions without infringing the copyright were, as a practical matter, unable to
obtain licenses from the owners of the works they wished to perform. ASCAP was
organized as a 'clearinghouse' for copyright owners and users to solve these problems.
400 F. Supp. 737, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Usually composers enforce their copyrights by becoming a member of an organization like
ASCAP or BMI. Membership requires that the copyright owner grant the organization a nonexclusive right to license performances of the composer's musical compositions. Ocasek v.
Hegglund, 116 F.R.D. 154, 156 (D. Wyo. 1987).
ASCAP's and BMI's licensing of state entities, not including licensing of public broadcasting
entities, generates approximately $750,000 annually. See Comment Letters, supra note 42,
Letter No. 2a at 6-7.
60. In the film industry, motion pictures are usually first released for performance at local
movie theaters. A second distribution is then made to the "non-theatrical" markets. That
market is dominated by state entities, such as universities, colleges, schools, hospitals, and
correctional facilities. See Brief for Columbia, supra note 48, at 3.
61. See generally The Copyright Remedy Clarification amendment: Hearings on H.R. 1131
Before the Subcomm on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admin. of'Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (July 11, 1987) (statement of General
Counsel, National School Board Association and Chairman, Educators' Ad Hoc Committee on
Copyright Law) ("[C]omments on actual losses are either speculative or isolated and anecdotal
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These cases do, however, provide some useful information about the scope
of the problem. First, they suggest that unauthorized state use of copyrighted works is on the increase. The first case on point was reported in

in nature."); id. at 3-4 (statement of University Counsel, University of California).
62. The entire list of reported decisions on point are: BV Eng'g v. University of Calif., Los
Angeles, 8E8 F.2d 1394, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1988) (in suit seeking damages for copying of
computer software and user manuals, court assumes, without deciding, that Congress may
abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity pursuant to the copyright clause;
nevertheless, court holds Congress did not exercise this power in the 1976 Act), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1090 (1989); Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford Univ., 852 F.2d 114, 116-22
(4th Cir. 1988) (suit challenging use of photographs in student prospectus; state official may
be sued in her individual capacity; court did not reach issue of whether Congress has power
to abrogate states' eleventh amendment immunity; court holds Congress did not create a cause
of action against the states; state does not waive its immunity by participating in conduct
regulated by the 1976 Act), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, (1989); Mills Music, Inc. v. State of
Ariz., 591 F.2d 1278, 1281-87 (9th Cir. 1979) (eleventh amendment does not bar action for
monetary damages, attorney's fees, and costs arising out of alleged infringement of song used
in state fair promotion; states were intended to be defendants under 1909 Act; Congress
intended to abrogate state's immunity); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d. 777, 781-82 (8th Cir. 1962)
(eleventh amendment bars action for monetary damages arising out of school choirs' use of a
hymn); Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 136 (6th Cir. 1898) (since state employee violated federal
copyright law, he could not be acting as agent of the state; injunction prohibiting printing of
annotated laws of Michigan was not barred by eleventh amendment); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank
of Boston, 687 F. Supp. 11, 13-18 (D. Mass. 1988) (does not decide that Congress has power
to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity; no remedy exists under 1976 Act
because Congress did not unequivocally express its intention to abrogate that immunity; state
official can be personally liable), affd, 871 F.2d 166, 167-75 (1st Cir. 1989) (not reaching issue
of personal liability); Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Applied Innovations, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 698
(D. Minn. 1987) (denying defendants' claims on other grounds), aff'd on other grounds, 876
F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1989); Woelffer v. Happy States of Am., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499, 504, 505
(N.D. Il1.1985) (1976 Act does not contain language pursuant to which states can be held liable
for monetary damages and attorney's fees; injunctive relief barring use of slogan in state
tourism campaign available); Johnson v. University of Va., 606 F. Supp. 321, 322-24 (D. Va.
1985) (eleventh amendment does not bar awards of money damages for alleged misuse of
photographs; 1976 Act creates a remedy against states); Cardinal Indus. Inc. v. Anderson
Parrish Assoc., No. 83-1038-Civ-T-13, slip op. (N.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 1985) (state has not waived
it,; eleventh amendment immunity for copyright suits; state agency is not liable in indemnification action arising out of copyright claim because of the eleventh amendment), slip op.
(Sept. 6, 1985), (eleventh amendment prevents state officials from suit charging infringing use
of architectural plans; state's immunity has been neither waived nor abrogated by Congress
under 1976 Act), slip. op. (May 7, 1986) (remaining actions against private individuals
dismissed because no infringement found), aff'd mem., 811 F.2d 609 (11th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom., Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. King, 484 U.S. 824 (1987); Mihalek v. Michigan, 595
F. Supp. 903, 905-06 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (eleventh amendment bars action for monetary
damages in action arising out of use of designs in state promotional campaign; injunctive relief
is not barred), aff'd on other grounds, 814 F.2d 290, 297 (6th Cir. 1987); Association of Am.
Medical Colleges v. Carey, 482 F. Supp. 1358, 1361-62 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (injunctive suit
seeking to prevent disclosure of MCAT test not barred by eleventh amendment). Cf. Sioux
Falls Cable Television v. South Dakota, 838 F.2d 249, 251-52 (8th Cir. 1988) (state did not raise
eleventh amendment defense, although plaintiff sought injunctive relief which would issue
against state as well as state officers).
This list does not include the numerous cases which were settled or whose decisions were not
reported. E.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Servs.,
No. 83-C-1496-R, slip op. (E.D. Wis. Jan. 21, 1985) (final order settling citizen-state copyright
action pursuant to which state is enjoined "from showing movies to prison inmates without
authorization of plaintiffs).
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1898.63 From 1898 until 1980 only four other decisions were reported. 64
Twelve cases have been reported since 1980.65 The nature and extent of
state use of copyrighted materials was explored during the congressional
hearings on the Clarification amendment. The evidence received, although
limited, also supports the conclusion that unauthorized use is on the
increase. 66 Second, these cases suggest that unauthorized state use arises
principally in circumstances involving individual copyrighted works and
involving limited use or reproduction of these works. 67 None of the
reported cases involve widespread or wholesale copying of a number of
works. No state school board, for example, has yet been charged with
purchasing and making copies of each of the books it needs for its libraries
or for teaching its students. 68 Nevertheless, the unauthorized use has not
been insignificant. In several of the cases authors have charged states with
incorporating copyrighted works into state materials. Although only single
works were allegedly misused, the state materials were widely distributed.
For example, in Woelfer v. Happy State of America,69 and Mihalek v.
Michigan,7 0 the states were charged with unauthorized use of copyrighted
material in state tourism campaigns. Some of the alleged misuse involved
reproducing copies of the works in lieu of purchasing the number of copies
needed by the state entities. In BVEngineering v. University of California,Los
Angeles, 7' a state entity was charged with purchasing a single copy of a
computer software program and making the copies it needed. Similarly, in
Mills Music v. State of Arizona,72 a school choir director was charged with
making extra copies of a hymn for the school choir. The copying which
occurred in each of these cases was not substantial, but the cumulative
effect of such practices could have a serious effect on copyright holders.
Third, the limited number of cases, even if growing, suggests there has not
yet been any widespread consensus among state governments that they can
ignore the rights of copyright holders. This state of affairs may not have
held firm. There was testimony at the hearings on the Clarification
amendment to the effect that the post-Atascadero decisions which limited
had made some state agencies unwilling to pay for copyrighted
state liability
73
works.
Even though there is no evidence of extensive unauthorized use, the
increase in unauthorized use is of concern to copyright holders and should
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Howell v. Miller, 91 F. 129, 136 (6th Cir. 1898).
See supra note 62.
Id.
See H. Rep. No. 282, supra note 11, at 8.
See Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 12 at 2-3 (reviewing the characteristics

of prevailing defendants in recent eleventh amendment and copyright litigation).
68. But see Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 11 at 2 (suggesting copying of that
sort could occur); Register of Copyrights Report, supra note 42, at 12 (same).
69. 626 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Il1. 1985).
70. 595 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Mich. 1984), affd, 814 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1987).
71. 858 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989).
72. 591 F.2d. 1278 (9th Cir. 1979).
73. S. Rep. No. 305, supra note 11, at 10-11.
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not be dismissed as insignificant. 74 As discussed below in section III, their
7 5
perception is probably correct.

C. The Eleventh Amendment
As noted above, a number of authors have attempted to sue for
monetary damages states which have made unauthorized use of their
works.76 In all of the cases decided after 1985, the authors were unsuccessful because the courts held either that the eleventh amendment to the U.S.
Constitution prevented Congress from creating a combination citizen and
state copyright remedy,77 or that Congress had not indicated an intention
to create such a remedy in accord with the requirements of the eleventh
78
amendment.
The eleventh amendment to the Constitution provides: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. '79
Although relatively obscure, the amendment has had considerable impact
on the balance of the relationship between federal and state governments in
the judicial arena.8 0 It finds its origin in the efforts of many Southern states
74. It seems to have created a virtual call to arms in the copyright community. For
example, in the case of Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford Univ., 852 F.2d 114 (4th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989), a large number of organizatidns representing
copyright owners such as ASCAP, BMI, the Association of American Publishers, Information
Industry Association, the Songwriters Guild of America and Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts,
Inc. filed amicus curiae briefs. This call resulted in the adoption of the Clarification Act.
75. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
76. Because of a series ofjudicially created doctrines which limit the scope of the eleventh
amendment, federal courts have always had a limited ability to compel states to comply with
federal law. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. The most important of these
doctrines permitted copyright owners to obtain injunctions which prohibit future violations of
a copyright. Thus, as a practical matter, the eleventh amendment at most merely prevented
authors from suing for monetary damages.
77. See, e.g., Mihalek v. Michigan, 595 F. Supp. 903, 905 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (eleventh
amendment bars awards of money damages against states), aff'd on other grounds, 814 F.2d
290 (6th Cir. 1987).
78. All of the cases were decided prior to the enactment of the Clarification amendment.
See, e.g., Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 871 F.2d 166, 169 (1st Cir. 1989) (without deciding
issue of whether the eleventh amendment prevents Congress from fashioning a remedy,
holding that even if such authority exists, Congress did not exercise it); BV Eng'g v. University
of Calif., Los Angeles, 858 F.2d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090,
(1989); Richard Anderson Photography, 852 F.2d at 117 (same).
79. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
80. A complete discussion of the eleventh amendment is far beyond the scope of this
article. For further materials, see C. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign
Immunity (1972); J. Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States (1987); 1 C. Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History 91-123 (1926); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515 (1977) [hereinafter
Field, Part One]; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Congressional Imposition of Suits Upon the States Part Two, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1203 (1978);
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1889 (1983); Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Critical Evaluation, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1372 (1989); Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power
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to avoid the debts they incurred during the Revolutionary War,8 ' and it
played a similar role following the Civil War.8 2 Recently, the eleventh
amendment has restrained the power of private citizens to obtain monetary
redress for state violations of federal law.83 As with much of the Constitution, arguments about the meaning of the eleventh amendment often
involve broader questions about the appropriate scope of authority of a
national government in a federalist scheme. Some view the amendment as
an important weapon against federal intrusion into state affairs, arguing
the amendment severely restricts the power of federal courts to consider
combination citizen and state suits. The proponents of this view see the
amendment's ability to prevent these awards of monetary damages as an
effective and important barrier to federal intrusion into state treasuries, an
intrusion that otherwise would harm the independence of state
governments.8 4 They also see the bar against combination citizen and state
suits arising under state law as an important mechanism by which states
retain the capacity to interpret their own laws 8 5 and define the parameters
of sovereign immunity.
Those who advocate a more limited view of the amendment's reach
tend to focus on the need of the federal government to retain its superior
status in the federal scheme, arguing that the amendment is anachronistic
and of limited value. This view is supported somewhat by the numerous
Supreme Court doctrines that limit the eleventh amendment's reach, 86
especially those that permit combination citizen and state suits seeking
injunctive relief. This view is also supported by the substantial intrusion
into state treasuries resulting from the vast array of federal programs
funding state activities. By its terms, the eleventh amendment could be
interpreted as preventing federal courts from considering any combination
citizen and state suit, including copyright suits. Over the years, however,
the Supreme Court has eschewed such an interpretation, permitting some

to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and
Fourteenth Amendments, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1413 (1975).

81. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 n.1 (1959) (when
eleventh amendment was passed, states used it to keep from paying their debts to individual
creditors); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933) (motive behind passage of eleventh
amendment was to keep prosecution of state debts out of federal courts); see also C. Jacobs,
supra note 80, at 68 (acknowledging that scholars explain that the amendment won easy
approval as a result of the states' fear of being compelled to pay debts); J. Orth, supra note 80,
at 12-26 (discussing the states' concerns as to their ability to pay their war debts following the
Supreme Court's decision in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1973)).
82. See J. Orth, supra note 80, at 58.
83. Id. at 147.

84. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
85. See Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106-07 (1984).

86. For example, the amendment does not prohibit citizen-state injunctive actions, Ex

Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161-62 (1908); suits initiated by the United States, United States

v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965); or suits initiated by other states, North Dakota v.
Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1923). It also does not prevent citizen-state suits involving

federal law from being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court, if the claims arose in state
court. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 394 (1821).
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types of combination citizen and state suits to proceed, but barring others.8 7
The issue of whether the eleventh amendment prevents Congress from
creating a remedy for state copyright infringement has never been presented to the Supreme Court, and the Court's eleventh amendment
decisions relating to other federal statutes do not clearly resolve the
question. Nevertheless, as the analysis below demonstrates, the Court's
reasoning in recent decisions indicates that the Clarification amendment is
a lawful exercise of Congress' power to enact combination citizen and state
remedies.
1. HistoricalBackground of the Eleventh Amendment
As with many constitutional questions, the scope of the immunity
provided to states by the eleventh amendment cannot be determined by
reference to historical materials alone. 88 Although these materials do make
it clear that the amendment was intended to limit the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, they fail to clearly indicate the intended scope of that
restriction. 89 The fundamental issue left unresolved by these materials is
the extent to which Congress, acting pursuant to its Article I powers, can
enact combination citizen and state remedies that can be pursued in federal
courts. Farthermore, the historical materials do not resolve the question of
whether the amendment restricts the method by which those remedies can
be established, assuming that Congress has authority to do so. About all that
is irrefutably clear about the history of the eleventh amendment is that the
amendment was adopted in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia.90 Chisholm was initiated by Alexander Chisholm, the
executor of the estate of a South Carolina citizen who had supplied war
materials to Georgia during the Revolutionary War. Unsuccessful in his
attempts to secure payment by appeal to the state of Georgia and through
a suit in the local federal court, Chisholm attempted to bring an assumpsit
action directly in the Supreme Court of the United States under its original
jurisdiction. 9 1 Georgia did not respond to Chisholm's complaint, claiming
the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to consider claims against it.92
The Court, in a four to one decision, 93 held it had jurisdiction. 94 Reaction

87, See infra notes 88-124 and accompanying text.

88. But see Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev.
204 (1980) (the original intent of the framers of the Constitution should not resolve issues
about its meaning); cf. R. Berger, Government by Judiciary (1977) (scope of Constitution is
limited by drafters' intent).
89. A complete discussion of the historical materials is beyond the scope of this article. For
further information, see, inter alia, C. Jacobs, supra note 80, at 3-74; J. Orth, supra note 80,
at 12-29; C. Warren, supra note 80, at 101 & n.2; Gibbons, supra note 80, at 1899-1914.
90. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
91. The Constitution provides: "In all Cases... in which a State shall be Party ... the
Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
92. J. Crth, supra note 80, at 13.
93. At that time there were six positions on the Court. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1,
1 Stat. 73. The sixth seat was vacant because of the recent resignation of Justice Thomas
Johnson. J. Orth, supra note 80, at 12.
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to the Chisholm decision was immediate. 95 Within two days of the Chisholm
judgment's entry, a measure was introduced in Congress proposing an
the
amendment to the Constitution. Within one year of its introduction,
96
requisite number of states ratified the eleventh amendment.
Although there is agreement about the impetus for the amendment,
there is little agreement about the intent of those who were involved in its
passage. This historical dispute arises because there was only limited
discussion of the issue of state immunity during the framing and ratification of the Constitution, and even less discussion concerning the intended
97
scope of the eleventh amendment during the process of its adoption.
Moreover, to the extent the issue was discussed during the constitutional
debates, contradictory statements were made both by those who urged the
Constitution's adoption and by those who urged it be rejected. No clarifying
statements that are supported by the majority of those discussing the
document exist. Similarly, contradictory statements and motivations sur98
faced during the ratification of the eleventh amendment. Thus, it is
unclear whether the Constitution's framers intended that federal courts
have jurisdiction over combination citizen and state cases, and it is unclear
94. The members of the Chisholm majority, Justices Blair, Wilson, Cushing, and Jay,
reasoned that under the constitutional scheme, states were susceptible to suit in federal court
without further authorization from Congress. 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) at 449-79. Justice Iredell, the
lone dissenter, did not reach the constitutional question. He argued that the Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82, which had established the Supreme Court, did not
provide for assumpsit actions against the states. In his view, the Court could not consider
assumpsit actions against a state unless authorized by Congress. He reasoned that assumpsit
actions were not traditionally ones that could be brought against a sovereign and thus explicit
congressional authorization was necessary. 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) at 446. Although he did not reach
the constitutional question, he intimated that even with congressional authorization, an
assumpsit action could not be brought against a state. Id. at 448-49. It is this dicta, not Justice
Iredell's holding, which is referred to in the debate about the Framers' intent. See infra text
accompanying note 99.
95. There is some dispute about the extent of the reaction to the decision. The Supreme
Court wrote that the decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment
was at once proposed and adopted," Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934), and that
the decision created "a shock of surprise throughout the country." Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 11 (1890). On the other hand,JudgeJohn Gibbons writes, "Congress's initial reaction to the
Chisholm decision hardly demonstrates the sort of outrage so central to the profound shock
thesis." Gibbons, supra note 80, at 1926.
Perhaps the most hostile reaction to Chisholm came from the state of Georgia, where a bill
which mandated "death, without the benefit of clergy, by being hanged" for anyone
attempting to enforce the Chisholm judgment was passed by the Georgia House of Representatives, although not by its Senate. SeeJ. Orth, supra note 80, at 17-18 (also explaining that the
phrase "without benefit of clergy" meant that the normal exemption from capital punishment
for first offenders would not be applicable).
96. At that time, the union was composed of fifteen states. J. Orth, supra note 80, at 20.
By February 1795, 12 states had approved the proposed amendment. The proposed
amendment did not become part of the Constitution until January 1798, however, because of
a delay in the presidential proclamation of ratification. See C. Jacobs, supra note 80, at 67; U.S.
Const. art. V (approval of two-thirds of the states necessary for ratification).
97. J. Orth, supra note 80, at 27-28 (of the hundreds attending state ratification
conventions, few delegates addressed the issue as it applied to ratifying the Constitution).
98. See C.Jacobs, supra note 80, at 71-72 (discussing various factions and their reasons for
supporting or not supporting ratification).
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to what extent, if any, the eleventh amendment altered that vision. In

general, three historical versions have emerged. These versions may be
loosely called the absolutist view, the minimalist view, and the moderate
view.
Until recently, the most commonly held view was the absolutist view.
Under this interpretation, the Chisholm majority was wrong and the lone
dissenter, Justice Iredell, was correct: Article III did not include a grant of
jurisdiction to federal courts over suits by private citizens against states.
Most of those who support this view argue that the eleventh amendment

was adopted to "restore the original understanding [of the Framers]." 99
Thus, the eleventh amendment bars combination citizen and state suits

arising under both diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction.
This position is advanced in many of the Supreme Court's opinions and
approved in many scholarly writings. 10 0
Under the minimalist view, Chisholm was correct: the Constitution gave
the federal courts jurisdiction to consider both diversity claims and federal
question claims brought by private citizens against states. Most, although
not all, who advance this view argue that the eleventh amendment had a
limited goal-it was intended to prevent federal courts from hearing
diversity cases such as the assumpsit action in Chisholm.t0 1 Under the
minimali;t view, cases presenting issues of federal law were not intended to

be barred by the eleventh amendment. They can be heard in federal
courts.10 2 Under the moderate view, which is also supported by language in
99. Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 291-92 (1973)
(Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall apparently has since rejected this view and agrees
with Justice Brennan that the eleventh amendment applies only to diversity cases. See
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 301-02 (1985) (Marshall, J.,joining Brennan,
J., dissenting).
100. E.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934) (stating that absent consent, the
Constitution does not allow for suits brought by foreign states against states); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) ("the Constitution should not be construed to import any
power to authorize the bringing of... suits [by individuals against states]"); I C. Warren, supra
note 80, at 96 ("the vesting of any... jurisdiction over sovereign States had to be expressly
disclaimed and even resented by the great defenders of the Constitution"); Cullison,
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White Knight's Green Whiskers),
5 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 7, 9 (1967) (explaining that the majority of the framers wanted sovereign
immunity to "survive" the Constitution); Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and
Interpretation, 2 Ga. L. Rev. 207, 224-26 (1968) (arguing that the eleventh amendment was
intended to bar all suits against states by individuals).Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Scalia, and
O'Connor currently hold this position. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1,30-42 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting,joined by Rehnquist, J., Kennedy, J., and O'Connor, J.) (arguing that the
eleventh amendment applies to both federal question and diversity cases).
101. Field, Part One, supra note 80, at 515-18, 522 (purpose of eleventh amendment is to
prevent suits against states by citizens of other states); Mathis, supra note 100, at 224-30
(same). But c.f. Nowak, supra note 80, at 1414-15 (discussing examples of cases to which
eleventh amendment applies and does not apply).
102. Justice Brennan was the most vocal member of the Supreme Court to espouse this
position recently. From 1964 until his departure from the Court, he asserted in majority and
dissenting opinions that the historical evidence indicates the eleventh amendment applies only
to diversity cases. Employees, 411 U.S. at 309-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing at length
his interpretation of the historical evidence); Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks
Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 187 (1964) (Brennan, J.) (first raising, although not clearly stating his
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some of the Court's decisions,103 the Constitution gave federal courts the
power to hear all combination citizen and state suits. The eleventh
amendment, under the moderate view, was intended to create a total bar to
federal court jurisdiction in combination citizen and state diversity cases,
but only a limited bar in federal question cases. In federal question cases,
the amendment merely prevents federal courts from assuming jurisdiction
Congress from
without congressional authorization. It does not prevent
04
creating a combination citizen and state cause of action.'
Although the historical evidence is inconclusive, as Judge Gibbons has
pointed out, it tends to show that the framers of th.- Constitution intended
federal court jurisdiction for both diversity claims and federal question
cases and that the eleventh amendment was intended merely to apply to
diversity cases.10 5 Because the Supreme Court has not yet adopted a settled
view of the historical debates, the debate about the drafters' intent is likely
to continue. Perhaps Professor Orth stated it best when he observed, "[T]he
search for the original understanding on state sovereign immunity bears
this much resemblance to the quest for the Holy Grail: there is enough to
be found so that the faithful of whatever persuasion can find their heart's
view); see also Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 497 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (reviewing historical materials); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 258-90
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (same); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
125-26 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (same).
Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan in espousing this view. See
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating that a "fresh examination of the

Court's Eleventh Amendmentjurisprudence" is called for); id. at 247 (Marshall, J., Blackmun,
J., and Stevens, J., joining Justice Brennan's dissent which argued that state-citizen federal
question cases are not barred by the eleventh amendment); id. at 303 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Atascadero Court "compound[ed] a longstanding constitutional
mistake" and agreeing with Justice Brennan that "the case rests on misconceived history and
misguided logic").
Some earlier members of the Court also seem to have held this view. See, e.g., Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that Chisholm was a "sound
interpretation of the Constitution"); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883)
(Waite, C. J.) (suggesting that Chisholm was decided correctly).
Many scholars have also expressed this opinion. See, e.g., C. Jacobs, supra note 80, at 27-40;
Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. Colo. L. Rev. 139, 153-55 (1977);
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of
an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan.
L. Rev. 1033, 1045-63 (1983); Gibbons, supra note 80, at 1913-14; Nowak, supra note 80, at
1425-30.
103. See Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868, 1872, 1873 (1990)
(Supreme "Court has adopted a particularly strict standard to evaluate claims that Congress
has abrogated the States' sovereign immunity"); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 ("Congress may
abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by
making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 698 n.3 (1978) (statutes enacted pursuant to fourteenth amendment limit the
principle of sovereign immunity embodied in eleventh amendment); Ex Parte State of New
York, No.1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (eleventh amendment forbids suits against a state by
citizens of another state); Monaco, 292 U.S. at 329 (in absence of state's consent, eleventh
amendment is absolute bar to suits against a state by citizens of another state).
104. See Nowak, supra note 80, at 1442 (arguing the eleventh amendment does not limit
congressional power).
105. See J. Orth, supra note 80; Gibbons, supra note 80.
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desire."106

2. The Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment Doctrine
An analysis of Supreme Court case law interpreting the amendment
leaves numerous issues unresolved as well. Nevertheless, the current view
of a majority of the Court is that first, Congress has the power to adopt
citizen-state remedies pursuant to at least one, and perhaps all, of its Article
I powers. 10 7 Second, when it exercises that power, Congress must make its
intent to create a combination citizen and state remedy clear in the statute's
language.' 08
Both of the issues were settled in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,109
decided in 1989. In Union Gas, the Supreme Court held that federal courts
have jurisdiction over combination citizen and state suits brought pursuant
to statutes adopted under the authority of the commerce clause." 0 In so
doing, the Court made it clear that the eleventh amendment does not
present an absolute barrier for all causes of action created pursuant to
Congress's Article I powers. 111 Although the court rejected the absolutist
view, clearly stating that the eleventh amendment did not bar consideration
of commerce clause cases,"12 it did not explain whether it was adopting the
minimali:3t view that the eleventh amendment has no applicability to any
federal question case, or the moderate view. The Court also did not clearly
answer the narrower question of whether federal courts have the power to
consider claims brought pursuant to statutes adopted under any of Congress's other Article I powers. An examination of the Court's rationale in
Union Gas, however, demonstrates the eleventh amendment presents no
barrier to Congress' creation of combination citizen and state copyright
remedies that can be litigated in federal court.
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., the Union Gas Company, a private
company, filed a third-party complaint seeking to hold the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania partially liable for coal tar clean-up costs for which the
United States had sued Union Gas under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)."3
Pennsylvania sought to avoid liability on the theory, inter alia, that the
106. J. Orth, supra note 80, at 28.
107. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), the Court held that Congress could
adopt the remedy in Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(1964), punuant to which states could be liable. Congress' power granted in section five of the
fourteenth amendment authorized the creation of such a remedy. See U.S. Cont. amend. XIV,
§ 5.
108. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1984).
109. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
110. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to "regulate Commerce") [hereinafter commerce clause].
111. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 18.
112. See lupra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. The absolutist view argues that federal
courts do not have the power to consider any citizen-state claim which was brought pursuant
to a statute adopted under any of Congress' Article I powers.
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-26, 9651-52, 9654-62, 9671-75 (1982) [hereinafter CERCLA].
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eleventh amendment prevented Congress from enacting a law providing a
cause of action which could be employed by a private party, such as Union
Gas, to sue a state. 14 The Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment did not prevent Union Gas' suit.' 15
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, gives only limited
guidance with respect to its theoretical underpinnings and thus leaves a
number of important issues unresolved. justice Brennan reasoned that
Congress's power to adopt combination citizen and state remedies under
the commerce clause was not barred by the eleventh amendment because
"to the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate
commerce [under the original constitutional plan], they also relinquished
their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this
authority, to render them liable." 116 He reasoned further that the language
of the eleventh amendment could not be1 interpreted
"to wipe out original
7
understanding of congressional power."
Although this language suggests that the eleventh amendment presents no barrier in any federal question case," 8 Justice Brennan inexplicably stated his decision was not overruling Hans v. Louisiana."19 Hans is an
1890 decision in which the Supreme Court discussed the eleventh amendment in the course of denying federal court jurisdiction over a contract
clause case.' 20 In leaving Hans undisturbed, Justice Brennan left unre114. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 2.
115. Id. at 23.

116. Id. at 19-20.
117. Id. at 18.

118. This rationale is consistent with Justice Brennan's view, articulated in earlier decisions,
that the original constitutional plan gave the federal courts jurisdiction over all citizen-state
suits and that the eleventh amendment was intended only to remove jurisdiction over cases
arising under state law. See supra note 102.
119. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
120. Id. at 11-18. In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana sought to sue the State of Louisiana for
failing to honor its Civil War bonds. The plaintiff argued that the state had impaired the
validity of his contract in violation of the contract clause of the U.S. Constitution. 134 U.S. at
1-3 (relying on U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, which states: "No State shall... pass any ... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... " [hereinafter the contract clause]). The plaintiff
claimed the Court had jurisdiction to consider his case under article III of the Constitution,
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that "[tihejudicial power [of the United States] shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution"), and the Judiciary Act
of March 3, 1875, Ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (providing that "the circuit courts of the United
States shall have original cognizance ... of all suits... at common law or in equity.., arising
under the Constitution ... of the United States"). 134 U.S. at 9. The Court dismissed the claim
with language which left the basis of its decision unclear. 134 U.S. at 20-21.
Some have argued that the Hans Court held the eleventh amendment prevented consideration of any citizen-state claim, including Hans' claim, which arose under federal constitutional
law. See, e.g., Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 30-42 (Scalia,J., concurring and dissenting); Marshall, The
Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1372,
1379-80 (1989) (same). Others have argued that the decision relied on sovereign immunity
doctrines which, although reflected in the eleventh amendment, are not immutable constitutional barriers. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring). Another voice has argued
that Hans does not even address the federal question issue, but rather turns on the state law
claim. Burnham, Taming the Eleventh Amendment Without Overruling Hans v. Louisiana,
40 Case W. Res. 931 (1989). Justice Brennan, in earlier decisions, stated that the eleventh
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solved the issue of the extent to which the eleventh amendment applies to
federal question cases generally.
The assertion that Hans was not overruled by the Court's holding in
Union Gas may be interpreted in several different ways. It might be
interpreted, for example, as an indication that the eleventh amendment
applies to some Article I powers although it does not prevent claims that are
grounded in the commerce clause, such as Union Gas' CERCLA claim. It
might also be interpreted as indicating that the amendment only bars those
claims not grounded in a statute adopted by Congress, because Hans' claim
was constitutional rather than statutory. Alternatively, the assertion could
be a sign that in the future the Court may hold that the eleventh
amendment has no applicability to federal question cases, but that it is
unwilling to hand down such a far-reaching decision at this juncture.
The deciding vote in Union Gas was cast by Justice White, whose
concurring decision merely muddied the waters by stating: "I agree with
...Justice Brennan... that Congress has the authority under Article I to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I do
not agree with much of his reasoning." 12 1 In a footnote, Justice White
indicated that Hans should not be overruled for the reasons stated in the
plurality decision in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public
Transportation.122 In Welch, the plurality opinion asserted that the eleventh
amendment applied to federal question cases.123 Justice White did not
explain, however, what he meant by his reference to Welch. Thus, his view
as to the exact role of the eleventh amendment was left unresolved. At
most, this reference suggests that he may have adopted the moderate
24
view.1
As a result of these ambiguous opinions, it is unclear from Union Gas
as to whether a majority of the Court has adopted the minimalist view or
the moderate view. Union Gas, however, is instructive with respect to one
important issue pertaining to the problem of state copyright liability. A
clear majority of the Court rejected the absolutist view and held instead that
federal courts can consider citizen-state suits brought pursuant to remedies
adopted under at least one of Congress' Article I powers. As the discussion
below indicates, the portion of the decision rejecting the absolutist position
clearly indicates that the eleventh amendment does not bar citizen-state
copyright suits.

amendment has no applicability to federal question cases. Supra note 102. Thus, if he feels
Hans should not be overruled, its limiting principles would come from outside of the
amendment. Justice Stevens adopted this position in Union Gas, arguing that the decision is
based on notions of federalism. 491 U.S. at 26 (Stevens, J., concurring).
121. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 57.
122. Id. at 2295 n.8 (citing Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468 (1987))
123. Welch, 483 U.S. at 485.
124. See supra note 103-04 and accompanying text for a discussion of the moderate view.
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3.

Applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to Copyright Causes of
Action

Although the Union Gas decision makes it clear that Congress can
create combination citizen and state remedies pursuant to the commerce
clause, neither the plurality nor Justice White stated whether their analysis
might extend to other Article I powers, including the copyright clause. It
seems that the plurality was hinting at a very broad power that could
abrogate the immunity under any authority enumerated in Article 1.125 Yet
nowhere does the Court explicitly state that proposition. Nevertheless, a
review of the rationale of the plurality decision and the Court's rationale in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,126 the only other Supreme Court case to recognize a
power of "abrogation," 12 7 indicates that the Clarification amendment is a
constitutional exercise of congressional power.
Fitzpatrick was the first case in which the Court held that Congress has
the power to create a citizen-state remedy cognizable in federal court. In
this case, the plaintiffs sued the State of Connecticut1 28 under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,129 which had been adopted pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The state argued that the
eleventh amendment barred the back pay and attorney's fees sought by the
plaintiffs. 3 0 The Court disagreed, holding that Congress could create a
combination citizen and state remedy for monetary relief under the
fourteenth amendment because that amendment embodied a limitation on
state authority, and thus the eleventh amendment gave the state no
immunity.13 ' The Court quoted the following passage from Ex parte
Virginia 3 2 to explain the decision:
[I]n exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations
which the Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her
rights do not reach to that extent. Nor can she deny to the general
government the right to exercise all its granted powers, though
they may interfere with the full enjoyment of rights she would
have if those powers had not been thus granted. Indeed, every
addition of power to the general government involves a corre125. See supra note 102.
126. 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976) (permitting a citizen-state suit to proceed).
127. The term "abrogation" is often used in eleventh amendment analysis, in this author's

view too loosely and in some instances, incorrectly. The word "abrogation" assumes that the
eleventh amendment has some relevance to Article I inquiries. That issue is still subject to
debate. If the amendment is not applicable to federal question cases, then Congress is not
abrogating anything when it enacts a citizen-state remedy under Article I.
128. The suit was brought against the State Treasurer, the State Comptroller, and the

Chairman of the State Employees' Retirement Commission of the State of Connecticut. For
eleventh amendment purposes, this was a suit against the State of Connecticut as the real party
in interest, not the named party, in determining the applicability of the amendment's
immunity. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 445. See also Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 631 (9th Cir.
1988) (§ 1983 suit barred because the state was the real party in interest).

129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
130. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 451.

131. Id. at 456.
132. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
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sponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States. It
is carved out of them.13 3
The passage is significant because it relies on notions of federal supremacy
and state surrender of rights, notions not unique to the fourteenth
34
amendment.
In Union Gas, the plurality decision employed similar reasoning. It
argued that the commerce clause granted Congress the authority to create
citizen-state remedies "[b]ecause the Commerce Clause withholds power
from the States at the same time as it confers it on Congress, and because
the congressional power thus conferred would be incomplete without the
authority to render States liable in damages ... 135s
The Court concluded
that the states accepted this limitation on their authority when they signed
the Constitution and this limitation was not altered by the eleventh
36
amendment.
Neither of these decisions used language that limits its scope to the
particular powers discussed. Instead, taken together, they speak broadly of
constitutional grants which, to be effective, require a superior federal
power and a concomitant surrender of state authority. To implement these
constitutional grants effectively, Congress necessarily must be able to
abrogate state immunity. Moreover, the constitutional grant may either
explicitly, as with the fourteenth amendment, or implicitly, as with the
commerce clause, diminish state governmental powers.' 3 7
Important, although perhaps not critical, in the evaluation of whether
a particular grant of federal power carries with it a federal power to create
combination citizen and state remedies is whether suits for monetary
damages by individuals are necessary to protect fully the interests regulated
under the power. 38 As the discussion below shows, the copyright clause
133. Id. at 346.
134. For example, it does not place emphasis on the fact that the fourteenth amendment
was adopted after the eleventh amendment and thus could be seen as a subsequent restriction
on the scope of the eleventh amendment's limitation. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
717-18 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-20.

136. Id.
137. The fourteenth amendment explicitly limits state authority. It provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV (emphasis added). The commerce clause, on the other hand, contains
no similar language. Nevertheless, on innumerable occasions it has been construed as
including a limitation on state authority. See, e.g., Employees of the Dep't of Health & Welfare
v. Missouri Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 286 (1973); Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala.
Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (requiring state-operated railroad to waive sovereign
immunity and submit to suit in federal court). The copyright clause, like the commerce clause,
contains no explicit language diminishing state authority. It does, however, implicitly limit
state power.See infra notes 159-73 and accompanying text.
138. The issue of monetary damages is mentioned in Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 19-22, but not
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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meets this requirement.13 9 Like the commerce clause, the copyright clause
is a grant of congressional authority that provides the federal government
with the ability to exercise final authority over states.1 40 The framers
envisioned a uniform national system to which state regulatory powers
would be subservient. 41 Furthermore, the framers envisioned that monetary damages in private citizen suits would be an important element in the
establishment of this superior federal authority.142
The origins of the copyright clause are somewhat shrouded in mystery
because the clause was introduced and adopted with little or no debate
during the Constitutional Convention and remained uncontroversial during the subsequent ratification process. It seems clear, however, that one of
the primary motivations for inclusion of the copyright clause in the
Constitution was the desire for a uniform national system of copyright law
which would supplant a patchwork system of local state control.' 43 Although all of the states except Delaware 44 had passed copyright statutes by

139. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text. The plurality decision in Union Gas

implies, but does not hold, that any of the Article I powers iyould meet this requirement. 491
U.S. at 14-15. The Court has not had an opportunity to decide this issue. In no other case has

a majority of the Court addressed the scope of Congress' power to adopt cdtizen-state remedies
pursuant to Article I. Justice Marshall did address it in his dissent in Hoffman v. Connecticut
Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 106 (1989). He reasoned that because the
bankruptcy clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, like the commerce clause, gives "Congress
plenary power over national economic activity," Congress could abrogate the state's eleventh
amendment immunity under the bankruptcy clause. Hoffmnan, 492 U.S. at 111 (Marshall, J.
dissenting). The majority in Hoffman did not reach the issue because it held that states could
not be sued under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 2824. See also Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 37-38
(Scalia, J., dissenting and concurring) (arguing that Justice Brennan's analysis would permit
Congress to enact citizen-state remedies pursuant to any Article I power).
As noted above, supra note 102, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens have
indicated in earlier opinions that the eleventh amendment does not present a barrier when
Congress exercises its Article I powers. Under that analysis, citizen-state c6pyright actions
could be pursued. Justice White has not yet expressed his view on this issue.
140. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) (noting that no state or citizen
may escape reach of congressional grant of copyright).
141. See generally infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text. See B. Bugbee, The Genesis of
American Patent and Copyright Law 125-31 (1967).
142. See infra notes 169-77 and accompanying text.
143. B. B3ugbee, supra note 141, at 126 ("to grant charters of incorporation in cases where
the public good may require them, and the authority of a single state may be incompetent");
See Latman, Gorman & Ginsberg, Copyright for the Nineties 4 (3d ed. 1988).
144. See Copyright Office, Copyright Enactments, Laws Passed in the United States Since
1783 Relating to Copyright, Copyright Office Bulletin No. 3 at 1-21 (1963) [hereinafter
Copyright Enactments].
The colonies provided little, if any, copyright protection to American writers until the
1780's. The only general statute which existed in the colonies before 1783 was a statute
adopted by Massachusetts in 1672, in response to the urging of John Usher, a wealthy
merchant-bookseller, who sought protection for one of his works. Massachusetts Records, IV,
pt. 2, 527 (cited in B. Bugbee, supra note 141, at 66). It seems to have been of limited value.
The next year Massachusetts passed an act providing protection specially for Usher's book. Id.
There were a few other isolated efforts to protect copyrightable material by private bill, only
a few of which were successful. I. Lowens, Music and Musicians in Early America 59 (1964)
(cited in K. Silverman, A Cultural History of the American Revolution 396, 400 (1976)).
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the time the Constitution was adopted, these state laws failed to provide
American authors 45 with adequate protection. First, all authors were not
treated similarly within a single state. Some of the states provided protec46
tion to out-of-state authors only if their states passed similar legislation.'
Second, not all of the states adopted copyright legislation; therefore, an
author could not secure protection for a work throughout the entire
country. Moreover, Maryland and Pennsylvania had copyright statutes that
included provisions preventing these statutes from becoming effective
unless all of the other states passed similar copyright legislation. Delaware
did not enact similar legislation, so the Maryland and Pennsylvania statutes
never took effect. Third, the protection provided by state statutes was not
uniform. 47 For example, the period of protection varied from state to
state. 148 In addition, some states required registration 49 while others did
The exact impetus for the sudden explosion of protection in the 1780's seems in part to be
the result of the substantial increase in writings by Americans. Id. Through the efforts of Noah
Webster, Joel Barlow, and others, the Continental Congress appointed a committee to explore
the issue of copying. J. Madison, 8 The Papers of James Madison 97 n.2 (Rutland, Rachel,
Ripei & Teute eds. 1978); Copyright Enactments, supra, at 1 (one of the members of the
Committee was James Madison). On the basis of the Committee's recommendations, the
Continent2l Congress passed an act encouraging all states to protect authors' rights. Resolution Passed by the Continental Congress, May 2, 1783, H.R.J. Res., Cont. Cong. (1783),
reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra, at 1. By 1786 all states except Delaware had passed
copyright laws. Id. at 1-21.
145. Most statutes did not protect works by foreign authors. There were only a few
Americans writing marketable copyrightable materials during the colonial period. See also K.
Silverman, A Cultural History of the American Revolution 46-47 (1976). As a result, much of
the printing industry was publishing works by European authors. It was advantageous for
American publishers not to provide protection for those authors. Id. at 46-69. The first U.S.
copyright statute only protected American authors. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat.
124 (1790). It was not until 1891 that US. copyright law provided protection for foreign
authors. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 13, 26 Stat. 1110 (1891).
146. Conn. Acts, § 7, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 2; Mass. Acts,
§ 3, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 4; 1791 N.C. Sess. 563-65, § III
(I. Iredell ed.), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 16. These provisions are
not remarkable if viewed in the context of the independent status of the states under the
Articles of Confederation. Even today most nations extend copyright protection to foreigners
only if that protection is reciprocated. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104 (b)(5) (1988) (U.S. protection
extended to a foreign author only if similar protection is provided to U.S. citizens by the
country of origin of the foreign author.)
147. See Bugbee, supra note 141, at 128.
148. E.g., Conn. Acts §§ 1, 3, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 2
(providing for two fourteen-year terms); Mass. Acts, § 2, reprinted in Copyright Enactments,
supra note 144, at 4 (providing for one twenty-one year term); N.H. Laws, § 2, reprinted in
Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 8 (providing for one twenty-year term).
149. E.g., Conn. Acts, § 2 (registration with Secretary of State), reprinted in Copyright
Enactments, supra note 144, at 2; M. Laws, § 3 (registration with the Clerk of the Maryland
General Court), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 6; Mass. Acts, § 3
(registration with University at Cambridge), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note
144, at 4; 1783 N.J. Gen. Assembly Acts, c.21 § 1 (Collins) (registration with Secretary of
State), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 7; N.Y. Laws, § 1 (registration
with Secretary of State), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 19; N.C. Sess.
Laws, § 1 (registration with Secretary of State) reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note
144, at 16; Pa. Laws, § 4 (registration with Prothonotary's Office in Philadelphia), reprinted
in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 11; S.C. Acts, § 2 (registration with Secretary of
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not, 150 and the requirements for granting licenses varied from state to
in state laws made it extremely difficult to
state. 151 These inconsistencies
52
obtain adequate protection.
The difficulties these laws presented caused a number of vocal and
politically influential writers to lobby for a national authority to adopt
uniform copyright legislation. It was largely a result of their efforts that the
copyright clause was proposed and unanimously adopted by the Constitu-

tional Convention.'53 Several other concerns surrounding the adoption of
State), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 13; Va. Acts, § 2 (registration
with Clerk of Council), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 15.
150. N.H. Laws, § II, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 8; 1783 R.I.
Acts & Resolves 6, 7 (Carter), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 9.
151. Conn. Acts, § 1 (consent of author signed in the presence of two witnesses), reprinted
in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 2; Ga. Law, § I (permission of author signed in
the presence of two witnesses), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 17; M.
Laws, § II (consent signed in presence of two witnesses), reprinted in Copyright Enactments,
supra note 144, at 5; Mass. Acts, § 3 (consent of author), reprinted in Copyright Enactments,
supra note 144, at 4; N.H. Laws, § 3 (consent of author), reprinted in Copyright Enactments,
supra note 144, at 8; N.J. Laws, § 1 (consent of author in writing duly attested), reprinted in
Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 7; N.Y. Laws, § 1 (consent of author signed in
presence of two witnesses), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 19; N.C.
Sess. Laws, § I (consent of author signed in presence of two witnesses), reprinted in Copyright
Enactments, supra note 144, at 16; Pa. Laws, § III (consent of author), reprinted in Copyright
Enactments, supra note 144, at 10; R.I. Acts & Resolves, § 3 (consent of author) reprinted in
Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 9; S.C. Acts, § 1 (consent of proprietor in writing
signed in presence of two or more credible witnesses), reprinted in Copyright Enactments,
supra note 144, at 12; Va. Acts, § I (consent of author signed in presence of two witnesses),
reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 15. See also Hudson & Goodwin v.
Paten, 1 Root 133 (Conn. 1789) (deciding whether New York or Connecticut law applied to a
copyright claim to Noah Webster's Institute of English Grammar).
152. A. Latman, R. Gorman &J. Ginsburg, Copyright for the Nineties 5 (1989) [hereinafter
Latman].
153. The first printed draft of the Constitution, as reported by the Committee on Detail,
contained no mention of copyright. James Madison and Charles C. Pinckney later proposed,

on the floor of the convention, a number of amendments giving certain enumerated powers
to the federal legislature, including the power to adopt copyright legislation. J. Madison, Notes
of the Debates in the Federal Convention 477-78 (A. Koch ed. 1984) [hereinafter Notes]. The
clauses and amendments that had been proposed but not yet voted upon were submitted to the
Committee of Eleven. There is no record of the Committee's deliberations. The clause was

reported by the Committee without alteration and adopted by the Convention without debate.
Id. at 579-81.

Madison advocated a strong national role in copyright. He had been active in the copyright
activities of the Continental Congress. In House Document No. 398, "Observations, April,
1787, on the Vices of the Political System of the United States," Madison addressed the
Constitutional Convention about the flaws of the Articles of Confederation. Among the flaws
he enumerated was the fact that relationships between the states suffered from "want of
uniformity in the laws concerning naturalization and literary property." Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union, H.R. Doc. No. 398 at 595 (cited in Fenning, The Origin
of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 Geo. L. J. 109, 113 (1929)). The
Federalist Papers furthers Madison's position on copyrights. There he wrote:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has
been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to
useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good
fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot
separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have
anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.
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the copyright clause suggest that the Convention Delegates intended to
create a strong, uniform, national authority. First, by 1787, national
copyright legislation was a common component of other national
governments-Germany's scheme had origins from at least the early 1600s,
54
Italy's from the late 1400s, and England's dated from the early 1700s.1
Thus, the notion that a sovereign should regulate copyrights was'undoubtedly familiar to the framers. Second, with the emergence of the new nation,
many advocated the development of a strong national identity.155 Many of
the framers perceived a strong national literary voice to be an important
part 6f that identity. Federal copyright legislation, by providing encouragement to American writers, was seen as a means to aid in the development
of that identity.' 56 Third, there was sentiment that a copyright scheme
played an important role in maintaining an informed body politic.' 57 Thus,
the framers gave Congress the authority to adopt copyright legislation to
encourage the development of a body of political literature. Finally, the
framers undoubtedly were influenced by the fact that many of them were
authors. For these reasons, the grant given to Congress was intended to be
as forceful as possible to fully realize the goals of the copyright. As the
Supreme Court has observed, the copyright clause permits Congress to
establish "an exclusive right or monopoly, [whose] effects are [so] pervasive,
[that] no citizen or state may escape its reach."' 5 8
The possibility of both federal and state regulatory systems in the
copyright context differentiates the commerce clause and the fourteenth
amendment from the copyright clause. The commerce clause and the
fourteenth amendment bar state action whether or not the federal government has adopted regulation. States may not regulate interstate commerce
or deny due process rights to their citizens regardless of whether the federal
government has acted.' 59 In contrast, a state may adopt copyright legislation covering copyrightable works in the absence of federal law.
This concurrent copyright power provides states with the authority to
provide protection for copyrightable works which may be of "purely local
importance and not worthy of national attention or protection ....,1160 The
dual power of regulation, however, does not diminish federal authority in
that Congress can prevent state regulation of any copyrightable matters
J. Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 43 at 288 (1788) [hereinafter the Federalist Papers].
154. See B. Bugbee, supra note 141.
155. See generally K. Silverman, supra note 145.
156. See The Federalist Papers, supra note 153, at 288; K. Silverman, supra note 145, at
482.
157. G. Washington, Address to Congress (Jan. 8, 1790), reprinted in Copyright Office,
Copyright in Congress, 1789 to 1904, 115-16 (1976).
158. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) (emphasis added).
159. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404, 408 (1925); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824). But see Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Gov. of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) (states have power to regulate commerce where authorized by
Congress); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 433-36 (1946) (South Carolina tax
on out-of-stite insurance companies did not violate commerce clause).
160. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 558.
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which it deems to be of national importance. 161 Thus, as under the
commerce clause, states cannot regulate copyright matters that Congress
deems are of national significance and within the exclusive authority of the
national government, whether the use is by a state or a private citizen. 16 2
To the extent the courts have discussed the issue of federal versus state
authority, it is clear that state authority is limited. The issue has arisen
almost exclusively in preemption cases, in which the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts have held that state law is void under the
supremacy clause 63 if it "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." ' 16 4 Although
states have long regulated copyrightable works, they have done so only
when those works are not covered under federal copyright law. 165
Further evidence of the scope of federal copyright power is the fact
that Congress traditionally has acted with the clear perception that its
authority is supreme. The 1976 Act, which is a very extensive restriction on
the ability of the states to regulate copyrightable works, most clearly
illustrates this perception. 66 The most significant change brought about by

161. Id. at 560.
162. "When Congress grants an exclusive right or monopoly [under the copyright clause];
its effects are pervasive; no citizen or State may escape its reach." Id.
163. U.S. Const. art. VI, d. 2.
164. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
165. See, e.g., Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 569-70 (states free to regulate tapes and recordings not
then covered by federal law).
166. Under § 301 of the 1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988), state remedies that extend to
works within the subject matter of the federal copyright statute are preempted if they provide
for rights that are equivalent to those granted under the 1976 Act. See generally, Comment,
The Evolution of the Preemption Doctrine and its Effect on Common Law Remedies, 19
Idaho L. Rev. 85, 92-93 (1983) (discussing common law causes of actions that have survived
federal constitutional and statutory preemption doctrines).
In four cases decided prior to the adoption of section 301, the Supreme Court considered
the issue of federal preemption of state intellectual property claims. In Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (federal patent preemption) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (same), the Supreme Court held that state remedies
proscribing copying were preempted when they proscribed copying that was permitted under
federal law. The reach of these decisions, which seemed to preclude almost all state remedies
covering intellectual properties, was limited by Goldstein, 412 U.S. 546 (federal patent
preemption), and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (federal patent
preemption). In Goldstein, the Court permitted state regulation of sound recordings which, at
that time, were not covered by the federal copyright statute. The Court held that as to sound
recordings, "Congress [had] drawn no balance; rather it left the area unattended" and thus the
states were free to regulate. 412 U.S. at 570. InKewanee Oil, the Court held the state regulation
at issue was permissible, even though the federal law covered the works in question. The Court
reasoned that the state law did not "clash" with the federal statute, because the state law sought
to regulate different yet compatible objectives, thus, the state law was not preempted. 416 U.S.
at 491-93. See also Brignoli v. Balch Hardy and Scheinman, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1201, 1205
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding state copyright law preempted when state created right is equivalent
to any of the rights provided by 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988)); Abrams, Copyright Misappropriation and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 509 (discussing constitutional and statutory preemption of state laws under copyright
clause of the Constitution and 1976 Act).
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the 1976 Act is its coverage of unpublished works. 67 Under prior law,
unpublished works were not covered by federal law and therefore could be
protected under state law. 16 8 The 1976 Act, however, covers any work
whether or not
"fixed in any tangible medium of expression" regardless of
16 9
it has been published, leaving little for states to regulate.
Also, as with the commerce clause, the drafters of the copyright clause
clearly envisioned that private citizens would be a significant instrument of
enforcement. Historically, English copyright laws and the limited copyright
legislation adopted during the Articles of Confederation had protected the
copyright by allowing suits by private individuals. 7 0 This was true even
when the recoverable damages included fines that were to be turned over
to the government.' 7' The framers did not contemplate a different
framework for the federal law. The copyright clause, by its language,
envisions a mechanism to be enforced by individuals. It states that Congress
shall "secure . . .to Authors . . .the exclusive right to their respective
writings ....,,172 Many of the same individuals who had been involved in
the adoption of the U.S. Constitution provided further evidence of the
intent for private suits by establishing this remedy in the first U.S. copyright

167. What constitutes a published work within the meaning of the statute turns principally
on the question of whether the author has made physical copies of the work available for
public distribution. See 1 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 4.04, at 4-17 (1988).
168. 1 M. Nimmer, supra note 167 § 4.01, at 4-2.
169. 17 US.C. § 102(a) (1988).
170. Statute of Anne, § I; Ga. Law, § 1, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note
144, at 1; Md. Laws, § IV, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 6; Mass.
Acts, § 3, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 4; N.H. Laws, § 3,reprinted
in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 8; N.J. Laws, § 1, reprinted in Copyright
Enactments, supra note 144, at 7; N.Y. Laws, § 1, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra
note 144, at 19; N.C. Laws, § I, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 16; Pa.
Laws, § III, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 10; R.I. Acts & Resolves,
§ 2, reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 3; S.C. Acts, § 1, reprinted in
Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 12; Va. Acts, § I, reprinted in Copyright
Enactments, supra note 144, at 15.
171. Statute of Anne, § I (one-half of penny per page penalty to Queen); Conn. Acts, § 1
(damages two times value of all copies), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144,
at 2; Ga. Laws, § 1 (damages two times value of all copies printed), reprinted in Copyright
Enactments, supra note 144, at 17; Md. Laws, § II (damages of two pence per sheet),
reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 6; Mass. Acts, § 3 (damages of
£5-3000), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 4; N.H. Laws, § 3 (damages
of £5-1000), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 8; N.J. Laws, § 1
(damages of two times value of copies), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144,
at 7; N.Y. Laws, § I (damages of two times value of all copies printed), reprinted in Copyright
Enactments, supra note 144, at 19; N.C. Sess. Laws, § 1 (damages assessed at two times the
value to be distributed one-half to state, one-half to plaintiff), reprinted in Copyright
Enactments, supra note 144, at 16; Pa. Laws, § III (damages of two times value of copies),
reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 10; R.I. Acts & Resolves, § 3 (damages
of £5-3000), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 9; S.C. Acts, § 1 (damages
of one shilling per sheet to be distributed one-half to state, one-half to plaintiff), reprinted in
Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 12; Va. Acts, § I (damages of two times value of all
copies printed), reprinted in Copyright Enactments, supra note 144, at 15.
172. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
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statute.17 3

Finally, to ensure effective copyright enforcement, monetary damages
are needed. First, the ephemeral nature of many unauthorized uses makes
it difficult to protect copyrights with injunctive orders. Unless authors have
some policing mechanism available, they will have a difficult time determining whether their works are being used in violation of a court order.
Second, an injunctive order alone may not be enough to encourage a
recalcitrant state to recognize the copyrights of other authors. A state
subject to a court order simply can use another similar work, almost with
impunity. The only risk to the state is the possibility of a similar suit for
injunctive relief by the second author. If monetary damages are unavailable, however, the author of the second work, or even the first, may be
reluctant to engage in costly litigation. 74 Enforcement of an injunction also
includes expenses that may render an injunction of little value. 175 Third,
because many copyrighted works have limited lifespans, injunctions are of
173. See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56-58 (1884)
(scope of the first copyright statutes are illustrative of the framers' intent because many of
those involved in the adoption of the copyright clause also were involved in the adoption of the
first statutes).
174. Unauthorized performances of musical compositions provide a good example of this
problem. If a composer wants to challenge the use of a song, someone must be present during
the performance of the work to provide evidence of the infringement. If no one who is acting
on behalf of the composer is present, more likely than not there will be no evidence to prove
a work was performed in violation of any copyright. Clearly, composers and their agents
cannot be waiting and listening for the unscheduled moments when their works will be
performed in a school play, on a state college jukebox, over a state college radio station, or at
a party sponsored by a fraternity at a state school. As a result, most composers are affiliated
with performing rights societies which enforce their rights. These societies are authorized by
their members or affiliates to grant performance rights licenses and to bring infringement
lawsuits. Two of these societies, ASCAP and BMI, collectively own the rights to over 95% of
American popular musical compositions. Note, Blanket Licensing of Music Performing Rights
in Syndicated Television: It's Time to Change the System, 9 Whittier L. Rev. 331, 332 (1987)
(citing Norton, Who Pays the Piper, Fortune, June 23, 1986, at 120).
Performing rights societies obtain evidence of copyright infringement by monitoring
randomly selected performances of entities or persons who have not purchased licenses from
the societies. For example, performing rights societies may listen to a randomly selected
broadcast on a college radio station. The compositions that are performed during the
monitored time period form the basis of the infringement action. If different time periods had
been chosen, the compositions serving as the basis for the lawsuit would have been different.
They might differ not only as to the songs performed but also as to the persons who composed
them. As a result, the injunctions that issue in such infringement actions are of limited value.
They may enjoin only the performances of the specific composer's songs that were performed
at the randomly selected times. Therefore, infringers would not be under court order with
respect to any other compositions. Accordingly, the infringing users may continue to make
unauthorized performances of other compositions without any serious consequence (except,
of course, the costs and attorney fees associated with another lawsuit by the performing rights
society). Only the threat of damages provides sufficient incentive to halt future unauthorized
performances. See generally Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 23 at 7-9 (discussing
this problem).
BMI asserts that the recent decisions in the area of copyright and eleventh amendment have
resulted in the unwillingness of some government agencies to obtain licenses for musical
attractions in government owned stadiums and arenas. Comment Letters, supra note 42,
Letter No. 18 at 2.
175. See S. Rep. 305, supra note 11, at 12.
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limited value. For example, an injunction prohibiting future use of newsworthy photographs and popular songs could be of little value.1 76 Fourth,
in some cases, courts have refused to award injunctive relief on the ground
that such an order would not be equitable.1 77 In those situations, if
unavailable as well, the copyright owner would be left
monetary relief were
78
without redress.'
Thus, the copyright clause is similar to the commerce clause in several
important respects. Like the commerce clause, the original constitutional
plan envisioned a broad-reaching federal authority which, when necessary,
would restrict and limit state power. Also similar to the commerce clause,
the framers intended that the interests safeguarded by the copyright clause
be protected by private citizens in suits in which monetary damages can be
recovered. These similarities indicate that the framers of the copyright
clause envisioned the possibility that states would be subject to private
citizen copyright suits and that the eleventh amendment does not restrict
the congressional copyright grant.
III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The next inquiry is whether Congress should have amended the
federal law to provide a clear remedy against state use of copyrighted works
or, alternatively, states should be only indirectly subject to the strictures of
the 1976 Act. 179 To answer that question, this section of the Article first
176. See Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 21, Exhibit at 41, S. Rep. 305, supra
note 11, at 12.
177. See, e.g., New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584-85 (2d Cir.
1989) (denying injunction because plaintiffs delay in bringing action until after substantial
resiources invested in publication of book containing protected material); Abend v. MGA, Inc.,
863 F.2d 1465, 1478-80 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying injunction prohibiting future use of movie
incorporating plaintiffs work because of impossibility of separating plaintiff's work from the
film and the public's interest in viewing classic film), cert. granted, 493 U.S. 807 (1989);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Fox Amusement Co., 551 F. Supp. 104, 110 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (denying
injunctive relief when future possible violation of nonpayment of copyright fees was
speculative). See also 3 M. Nimmer, supra note 167, § 14.06(B) at 14-56 ("'vhere great public
injury would be worked by an injunction, the courts might ... award damages or a continuing
royalty instead of an injunction in such special circumstances").
At times, members of the Supreme Court have indicated that relief other than an injunction
may be more appropriate in some copyright infringement cases. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 499-500 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(approving circuit court's suggestion that in the case of continuing copyright infringement,
damages or continuing royalty may be appropriate remedy).
For cases denying preliminary injunctions, see Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d
384, 390 (5th Cir. 1984) (denying preliminary injunction because defendant would have no
remedy if later found not to have infringed copyright); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt
Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468, 1480 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (denying preliminary injunction
because of tailure to demonstrate irreparable injury, probable success, or the balance of
hardships in their favor); Farmers Indep. Tel. Co. v. Thorman, 648 F. Supp. 457, 458-59
(W.D. Wis. 1986) (denying preliminary injunction because defendant would be more harmed
than plaintiff.
178. See, e.g., Abend, 863 F.2d at 1478-80 (request for injunction prohibiting future use of
movie incorporating plaintiff's work denied, author left to damages remedy).
179. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the indirect methods
by which authors could have attempted to force states to comply with the 1976 Act before the
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examines the general purposes of copyright law in order to determine
whether a remedy for monetary damages against unauthorized state use is
necessary to achieve these goals. 8 0° Second, it examines whether such a
remedy should be provided under state or federal law and whether it
should be enforceable in state or federal court. The conclusion of this
inquiry is that copyrights serve significant purposes which are undercut by
unauthorized state use of copyrighted works and that the need for national
uniformity requires that the remedy be enforceable in federal court under
federal law.
A.

Foundations of Copyright Law

1. Background
The principal justification for copyright protection in American law is
the assertion that copyrights encourage authors to produce intellectual
properties, works which are of high value to society.' 8 ' The copyright,
which provides the author with a series of exclusive rights, provides
incentive to produce these works by enabling authors, first, to charge for
the use of their works 82 and, second, to limit the circumstances in which
their works will be used. 8 3 These rights provide copyright holders with
economic benefits and integrity benefits. The economic benefits are monetary rewards; the integrity benefits are nonmonetary rewards such as
personal pride, self-esteem, reputation, self-fulfillment, and selfexpression. These economic and integrity benefits can be of sufficient value
to induce potential authors to forego other remunerative activities in order
to produce intellectual properties. Without these incentives, it is argued,
authors will not create intellectual properties in the numbers desired by
adoption of the Clarification amendment.
180. State use of copyrighted materials may raise additional problems that are beyond the
scope of this article. For example, state use of copyrighted material might violate the
fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution which prevents states from taking private
property without compensation. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. See Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d
934, 939 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983) ("An interest in a copyright is a property
right protected by the due process and just compensation clauses of the Constitution.");
Mihalek Corp. v. Michigan, 595 F. Supp. 903, 908 (E.D. Mich. 1984), affd on other grounds,
814 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs' claim that the state's actions constituted a "taking" of
their property in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments rejected on the ground that
state immunity under eleventh amendment barred liability for damages); S. Rep. No. 1877,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) ("When the [U.S.] Government deliberately publishes a copyrighted article without obtaining the prior consent of the copyright proprietor, the general
assumption would be that the holder, pursuant to the principles of... our Constitution,
should be entitled to an action against the Government for infringement.") (reprinted in 1960
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3445). See also Hercules, Inc. v. Minnesota State Highway
Dep't, 337 F. Supp. 795, 798 (D. Minn. 1972) (use of patent invention by the government is
a violation of the takings clause).
181. See The Federalist Papers, supra note 153, at 279 n.43 (copyrights necessary to
promote production of literary works); Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45
Colum. L. Rev. 503, 506-11 (1945) (same); Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in
Copyright, 30 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 421, 424 (1983) (same).
182. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
183. Id.
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society. 18 4
The notion that the cluster of legal rights called copyrights should be
recognized because they provide incentives to produce socially desirable
works finds its origin in the writings of utilitarian theorists. These theorists
argue that legal rules recognizing property rights are justifiable only
because of the social benefits which the rules produce. 3 5 Under this view,
the legal rules vesting property interests in the creators of intellectual
properties lead to the production of works that benefit society.
Among the most significant benefits authors gain from copyrights are
the monetary rewards that accrue because authors have legal remedies
which allow them to restrict the use of their works.' 8 6 Authors cannot
physically prevent others from using their works. For example, absent a
legal remedy, an author of a poem, song, or play cannot prevent another
from committing that work to memory and performing or otherwise using
the work without paying the author. 8 7 Armed with copyrights, authors can
compel others to pay for the use of their works and, through the aggregate
charges, recover not only the cost of production but whatever additional
return is necessary to produce the economic incentive to create.
184. Hetlinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, Phil. & Pub. Aff. 31, 35-36 (Winter 1988).
185. Utilitarians argue that without the protection provided by property rules, individuals
cannot be certain that they will be permitted to enjoy a substantial share of the products of
their labor. According to rule utilitarian theory, if the owner of the property rights is given the
capacity to control how a particular resource will be used, when the resource will be used, who
may use the resource, and to whom this authority may be transferred, individuals will labor
diligently and invest freely in the development of resources. Utilitarian theory finds its modem
origins in the writings of, inter alia, David Hume and Jeremy Bentham, and has been
developed in the recent writings of the law and economics movement. J. Bentham, Theory of
Legislation chs. 7-10 (6th ed. 1890); D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. III, pt. II,
§§ 2-4, at 436-59 (1961); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 29-39 (1986). See generally L.
Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations 57-74 (1977). The argument applies easily
to copyrightable works. If authors are given the capacity to control the distribution,
reproduction, and use of their works, they will be able to recover benefits which in turn will
provide strong incentives to create. Hettinger, supra note 184, at 47-48.
186. Although the economic incentive behind the grant has been long recognized in
copyright law, the literature applying economic analysis to copyright law has been quite
limited. Some of the more important contributions in this area are: T. Macaulay, Speeches on
Copyright (C. Gaston ed. 1914); Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281 (1970); Hurt
& Suchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. (1966); Landes &
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325 (1989); Novos &
Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytical Approach, 92 J. Pol.
Econ. 236 (1984); O'Hare, Copyright: When is Monopoly Efficient?, 4 Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt.
407 (1985); Plant, The Economic Aspect of Copyright in Books, 1 Economica 167 (1934).
187. Most resources cannot be used by an unlimited number of people without being
diminished. For example, a tree cannot be cut down and used for furniture by one person
without limiting the capacity of others to use that tree. Intellectual properties, such as
copyrights, are unique in that they are not diminished if used by more than a single user. If
someone copies or performs a play, it does not diminish the capacity of others to perform or
copy that same play. Goods, such as intellectual properties, that are not diminished by use are
called "public goods." A. Alchian &W. Allen, Exchange and Production Theory in Use 251-53
(1969). The implications for this in a property regime is that if society wants to encourage the
production of public goods, it must provide potential creators of these goods with the
mechanism to exclude others from their use. Id.
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Contracts of sale, in which authors reveal previously undistributed
works, do not provide sufficient protection for authors because contract
remedies are available only against those individuals who are in privity of
contract.18 8 Therefore, under contract law, authors are able to secure
payment only from a limited group of users. Most authors cannot recoup
the entire costs of production from the initial users of their works because
these costs are generally too large to be borne by those limited groups. The
costs can be recovered only if authors receive remuneration from further
distribution of their works. Copyrights provide the mechanism by which
these additional payments can be assured.18 9
The copyright clause itself emphasizes that American copyright law is
founded upon a theory of incentive. The constitutional grant authorizes the
creation of copyright rights to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts." 190 This function is also prominently emphasized in Supreme Court
decisions as well as the congressional reports accompanying the adoption of
federal copyright statues. 19 1
In addition to the economic benefits, an author may obtain a variety of
other benefits which may be labeled integrity benefits. The term "integrity
benefits" refers to various personal rewards that flow from the ability of
authors to restrict the use of their works. They include enhanced reputation
and self-esteem, privacy interests, and a means to self-definition. For
example, authors who have written highly personal works can utilize
copyrights to limit the use and distribution of their works. 192 Similarly,
professors can use copyrights to maintain or establish professional reputations by licensing their works under circumstances that ensure publication
will take place only under their names and that limit alterations of the
188. J. Calamari &J. Perillo, Contracts § 17-1, at 691 (3d ed. 1987).
189. Copyrights may not always be necessary to recover costs. In some instances, a contract
between the author and the user will provide a sufficient economic return, e.g., some original
paintings. See generally, Landes & Posner, supra note 186.
190. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, d.8.
191. As the Supreme Court stated in Sony Corporation v. Universal City Studios:
[T]he monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (Copyright law is "intended definitely to grant
valuable enforceable right to authors, publishers, etc.. .. 'to afford greater encouragement to
the production of literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to the world.'" (quoting
Washington Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1936)); H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1909).
192. See Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12 Colum.J.L. & Arts 459
(1988) (discussing how privacy is protected by copyright law). But see Leval, 36 J. Copyright
Soc'y U.S.A. 167, 178-79 (1989) (asserting that privacy issues have no place in copyright law).
To be sure, American copyrights provide only limited protection for an author's privacy,
because the copyright monopoly is not absolute. For example, the fair use doctrine might
permit the use of a highly personal work. See, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d
1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1986) (portions of accounts of unwanted pregnancies could be copied
under fair use doctrine).

734
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works.' 93 Although American copyright law provides authors with legal
remedies that produce these integrity benefits, protection of integrity
benefits a:3 an end in itself has not played a major role in development of
federal copyright legislation to date. 94 These indirect benefits, however,
provide significant incentives for authors. 195
2. As Applied to Unauthorized State Use
The economic and integrity benefits of copyrights are as necessary to
encourage creation of copyrightable works intended specifically for state
use as they are for any other type of work. As noted above, states are
extensive users of copyrighted materials, including a significant number of
works created only for use by states. 196 The costs of producing textbooks
193. The integrity benefits discussed here are linked, though somewhat different from, the
concerns giving rise to personal and labor theories of property. Labor and personality theorists
justify property rights without regard to the consequences for society as a whole. American
copyright laav is utilitarian. It provides for copyrights only if they create incentives. Leval,
supra note 192, at 170.
Labor theory of property argues that property rights arise and vest in those individuals who
create resources, because they have merged their efforts or energy with the natural elements
to produce a resource. Labor theory of property was developed in the writings ofJohn Locke.
SeeJ. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government ("Of Civil Government") ch. 5 (Peardon ed.
1952). It is also seen in the writings of Blackstone and Spencer. See 2 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries 115-16 (Ehrlich ed. 1959); 2 H. Spencer, The Principles of Ethics 108-09

(1908).

Personality theory, grounded on notions of justice, builds upon the writings of labor
theorists and emphasizes the role of property rights in an individual's realization of self, of
human personality. Personality theory finds its development in the writings of, inter alia,
George Hegel and, more recently, Professor Margaret Radin. G. Hegel, Philosophy of Right
41-52 (T. Knox trans. 1967); Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 959
(1982).
194. Until recently, federal copyright law did not include any remedies specifically tailored
to provide authors with integrity rights. In 1990, however, Congress amended the 1976 Act to
provide moral rights protection for authors who create visual arts. Pub. L. No. 533, 104 Stat
27,9 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501, 511). These rights are limited in scope and applicability.
The limited nature of these rights stems from the widely held view in the U.S. that copyright
law should not be tailored to protect these rights. The notion of protecting integrity rights ha.
had a favorable reception in other nations. See generally, Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right:
A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors, and Creators, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 559 (1940);
Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16
Am.J. Comp. L. 465 (1968); Note, An Author's Artistic Reputation Under the Copyright Act
of 1976, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1490, 1493 (1979) (arguing that 1976 Act permits author to use
economic safeguards to 'protect the integrity of a work, thus protecting the author',.
reputation).
Some argue that integrity rights cannot and should not provide a theoretical foundation
upon which to base federal copyright remedies. See, e.g., Merryman, The Refrigerator of
Bernard Buffet, 27 Hastings L.J. 1023, 1035-36 (1976); Monta, The Concept of "Copyright"
Versus the "Droit d'Auteur," 32 S. Cal. L. Rev. 177, 185 (1959). Other commentators,
including the Register of Copyrights, argue for the recognition of this personal interest. See
House Comm. on theJudiciary, 87th Cong., lst Sess., Report of the Register of Copyrights on
the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 5-6 (Comm. Print 1961); Chafee, supra note
181, at 506-07.
195. Koeberke, Play it Again Samantha? Another Argument for U.S. Adherence to Article
6bis of the Berne Convention, 27 Duq. L. Rev. 609 (1989).
196. See supra note 42-54 and accompanying text.
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written for public schools, computer programs intended to facilitate the
enforcement of parking violations, and manuals to be distributed to state
troopers need to be recovered just as much as the costs of producing similar
goods for the private sector. While it is critical that states pay for materials
made for their use alone, the need to recover monies from states is
substantial even when works have not been produced solely for state use.
Payments by states help to satisfy the - aggregate amount necessary to
provide the incentive to create. Unless authors can be certain that they will
receive these funds, they will not produce197the works used by states in
sufficient numbers to meet society's needs.
Other mechanisms occasionally will produce payments by states. For
example, contract remedies and the desires of state agencies to maintain
continuing relationships with authors will, in many instances, ensure
payments. Unfortunately, these alternatives are inadequate to maximize
production of copyrightable works. Contract remedies are inadequate
because contracts only bind the original purchaser or someone in privity
with the original purchaser. The desire of a state to have future contacts
with an author is an effective incentive only if the author is irreplaceable or
otherwise in a strong bargaining position. That is not the case with most
authors. In most circumstances, a state can simply use another author's
works. Copyrights are the necessary legal rules to achieve the desired
economic return. 98
Similarly, integrity benefits are important to authors of works created
for state use. Unacceptable alterations or unauthorized use of a work by a
state is just as harmful to an author's interests as when private parties make
unauthorized use of copyrighted works. Indeed, for some authors, unauthorized use by a state may be even more objectionable. Thus, authors must
be given legal remedies to enable them to charge states for the use of their
works.
B. State Law or FederalLaw; State Forum or FederalForum
While the discussion above indicates that a remedy should be provided
to authors whose works are used by states without authorization, it is not
ineluctable that such a remedy be provided solely under federal law or in
the federal courts. An analysis of the relevant issues, however, indicates that
a federal remedy, enforceable in federal courts, is the better alternative.
A uniform and unitary system of copyright law is one of the essential
components of our national copyright law. Indeed, the need for uniformity
was one of the major reasons for inclusion of the copyright clause in the

197. See Comment Letters, supra note 42, Letter No. 6 (copyrights necessary to recover cost
of producing works for states)
198. In some instances, contract remedies or the desire to have a continuing relationship
with an author will be sufficient to insure a state's recognition of an author's rights. This will
be true especially when the author has produced a work for use principally by that state. These
incentives may not, however, be sufficient to discourage another state from using the work
without permission.
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Constitution. 199 A system in which state laws covered state government use
of copyrighted works would be wholly inconsistent with this scheme.
Considerable confusion would result because states would be subject to
different rules than other copyright users. 20 0 Furthermore, as discussed
below, the federal copyright statute provides a limited means by which state
use can be controlled. 20 ' If state law regulated some state activities while
federal law regulated others, even more confusion would result. For
example, combination citizen and state suits for injunctive relief in federal
courts could produce standards of state liability different than combination
citizen and state suits for monetary relief in state court.
For similar reasons, enforcement of federal copyright law in federal
courts presents a better alternative. Congress granted the federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over copyright actions in 1831, long before most
federal cases could be brought in federal court. 20 2 This long tradition has
produced a uniformity in copyright law which enables copyright holders
and users of copyrighted works to easily comprehend the scope of the
copyright monopoly. 20S Concurrent jurisdiction could produce conflicting
and undesirable results. 20 4 Exclusive jurisdiction in copyright cases produces uniformity in the substantive law. Therefore, because the eleventh
amendment does not bar enforcement of copyright remedies for monetary
199. For a discussion of the origins of the copyright clause, see supra notes 153-58 and
accompanying text.
Until the adoption of the 1976 Act, a dual system of copyright covered unpublished works
and published works. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1976) (reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5659, 5745). The systems did not, however, overlap. State
law covered works prior to publication and federal law covered works after publication. See
supra note 24 (describing publication under the 1909 Act). Thus, the two separate systems of
copyright law did not overlap coverage for any single copyrightable work. This dual system of
federal and state law was almost entirely abolished by the 1976 Act because Congress felt it
prevented the accomplishment of "the basic constitutional aims of uniformity and the
promotion of writing and scholarships." H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supra. at 129. See also Brown,
Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 1070 (1977)
(discussing uaification of copyright law); Note, Copyright Preemption: Effecting the Analysis
Prescribed by Section 301, 24 B.C.L. Rev. 963, 972-80 (1983) (same).
200. Assuming, of course, they waived their sovereign immunity.
201. See iafra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
202. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 9, 4 Stat 436, 438. Congress did not grant the federal
courts general federal question jurisdiction until 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18
Stat. 470. There had been a short-lived grant in the MidnightJudges Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 11,
2 Stat. 89, 92, but this was promptly withdrawn. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132,
132. In 1831, the only federal question cases that could be brought in federal court were
admiralty cases, minor criminal cases, patent and copyright suits, and cases involving the Bank
of the United States. A. Conkling, Treatise on the Organization, Jurisdiction and Practice of
the Courts of the United States 92-93 (1830 & photo reprint 1985).
203. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162-63 (1989)
(exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts over federal intellectual property law produces
development of uniform body of law).
204. Conpare Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777 F.2d 678, 684-85 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding
California's "direct molding process" statute, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17300 (West Supp.
1985), not preempted by federal intellectual property laws) with Bonito Boats, 515 So. 2d 220,
223 (Fla. 1987) (holding Florida's "direct molding process" statute, Fla. Stat. § 559.94 (1985)
preempted), aff'd, 489 U.S. 141, 143.
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damages
against states, the remedy should be made available in federal
20 5
courts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is thus clear that the Clarification amendment was a necessary and
lawful exercise of congressional authority. It achieves important copyright
objectives and is not prohibited by the eleventh amendment.

205. Of course, if it is determined that such a remedy could not be enforced in federal
courts, a remedy that could be enforced in state court should be adopted. See Field, Part One,
supra note 80, at 546-49 (discussing ability of Congress to create remedies enforceable against
states in state court and concluding that neither the eleventh amendment nor other federalism
notions would prevent it); Fletcher, supra note 102, at 1094-98 (same); Hiowlett v. Rose, 110
S.Ct, 2430, 2434-42 (1990) (state may not defeat federal claim in state court with a sovereign
immunity defense).

